Trust Centre · Security

Written to answer the questionnaire before you send it.

Every control below is described the way an assessor would want it described: what it is, how it is enforced, and what it does not cover. Where a control is only on certain tiers, the tier is named. Where something is planned rather than shipped, it says planned.

Pre-answered CAIQ and SIG-lite are available under the click-through NDA. Last reviewed 14 Aug 2026.

Architecture and tenant isolation

KrewOS separates a Control Plane — identity, catalogue, manifests, policies, evaluations, releases — from an Execution Plane that runs compiled plans and holds run state. Every request carries a tenant context that is resolved at the edge and enforced at the data layer, not in application code that a bug could bypass.

Tenant isolation

Row-level isolation on every table with tenant scoping enforced by the database, plus separate object-storage prefixes with per-tenant encryption context. Cross-tenant queries are structurally impossible, not merely disallowed.

Network segmentation

Private subnets for all data stores, no public database endpoints, egress restricted to an allow-listed model gateway and declared connectors. Administrative access only through an authenticated bastion with session recording.

Execution sandboxing

Generated and custom code runs in ephemeral, resource-capped sandboxes with no ambient credentials, a restricted filesystem and network access limited to declared endpoints. Sandboxes are destroyed after each run.

Secrets gateway

Credentials are injected at the point of call by a gateway process. Keys never appear in prompts, logs, manifests, exports, support tooling or crash dumps, and are never returned by any API.

Compile-time effect proof

Before a release exists, the compiler statically proves that no path runs from untrusted input to an external side effect without an intervening approval gate. If the property fails, there is no release to deploy.

Dedicated options

Cloud Dedicated gives you isolated execution resources; Customer VPC and Private deployment move the Execution Plane into infrastructure you control, with the Control Plane still governing centrally.

Control summary

The scannable version. Availability by tier is stated where it differs.

DomainControlHow it is enforcedAvailabilityState
EncryptionIn transitTLS 1.3, HSTS, modern cipher suites only; internal service-to-service traffic mutually authenticatedAll tiersShipped
EncryptionAt restAES-256 on all volumes, object storage and backups, with per-tenant encryption contextAll tiersShipped
EncryptionCustomer-managed keysYour KMS key, revocable; revocation renders tenant data unreadable within the rotation windowRegulated tierShipped
IdentitySSO — OIDC and SAMLDomain-based discovery at sign-in; just-in-time provisioning with group-to-role mappingProfessional and aboveShipped
IdentityMFATOTP and WebAuthn; enforceable tenant-wide, mandatory for administrator rolesAll tiersShipped
IdentitySCIM provisioningUser and group lifecycle synchronised from your directory; deprovisioning revokes sessions immediatelyProfessional and aboveShipped
AccessRBAC and segregation of dutiesRole sets aligned to the platform personas; approver cannot be preparer where dual approval is configuredAll tiersShipped
AccessPrivileged accessNo standing production access. Time-boxed, four-eyes-approved, ticket-linked, fully session-recorded and surfaced in your tenant audit logAll tiersShipped
AccessSupport impersonationRequires explicit tenant consent per session, is read-only by default, is time-limited and appears in your audit trail while it is happeningAll tiersShipped
SDLCCode review and branch protectionTwo-reviewer requirement on the compiler, the secrets gateway and the policy engine; signed commits; no direct pushes to release branchesn/aShipped
SDLCDependency and secret scanningSCA and secret detection on every pull request and nightly on all release branches; critical findings block the buildn/aShipped
SDLCSAST and container scanningStatic analysis on every build; base images rebuilt and rescanned weekly with a 7-day critical patch targetn/aShipped
DataDLP and redactionConfigurable detection and redaction of identifiers before content reaches a model provider, with the redaction map retained inside your regionProfessional and aboveShipped
DataPrompt and output logging controlsPer-project setting for whether prompt and completion bodies are retained; metadata and evidence references are always retainedAll tiersShipped
ResilienceBackup and restoreContinuous write-ahead archiving with point-in-time recovery; restores rehearsed quarterly and the result recordedAll tiersShipped
ResilienceRecovery targetsRPO ≤ 15 minutes, RTO ≤ 4 hours standard; tighter targets available by agreement on the Regulated tierAll tiersShipped
MonitoringSecurity loggingCentralised, tamper-evident logs with 400-day retention; authentication, authorisation, privileged access and effect execution are all loggedAll tiersShipped
MonitoringAnomaly detection on agent behaviourAlerting on abnormal effect frequency, budget burn and retrieval patterns per crewProfessional and abovePlanned Q4 2026
AssuranceBug bountyPrivate programme with invited researchers; public programme deferred until the disclosure process has run a full yearn/aPrivate only

Incident response

24h notification
  1. Detect and declare

    Automated alerting plus a 24×7 on-call rota. Any suspected incident is declared within 30 minutes of triage rather than after confirmation.

  2. Contain

    Credential rotation, session revocation and tenant-level isolation are pre-scripted and rehearsed, not improvised during the event.

  3. Notify

    Affected tenants notified within 24 hours of confirmation, with what is known, what is not yet known and what you should do. PDPC notification handled in line with the PDPA where thresholds are met.

  4. Post-mortem

    Written, blameless, shared with affected tenants within 10 business days and summarised publicly on the status page.

People and process

  • Background screening
    All staff, pre-employment
  • Security training
    Onboarding plus annual
  • Secure-coding training
    Engineers, annual
  • Phishing simulation
    Quarterly
  • Access review
    Quarterly, evidenced
  • Device management
    MDM, disk encryption, EDR
  • Offboarding
    Access revoked same day
  • Vendor review
    Annual, risk-tiered
  • Policy set
    17 documents, annually reviewed

The full policy index, including which policies are available for review under NDA, ships in the security pack.

Threats specific to agent platforms

Generic SaaS controls do not cover the interesting risks here. These four are where an agent platform actually gets hurt, and each has a structural answer rather than a policy answer.

RiskWhy it is differentStructural control
Prompt injection reaching an external actionInstructions hidden in a retrieved document can attempt to steer an agent into sending, posting or payingThe compiler proves at build time that no untrusted-input path reaches a declared external effect without an approval gate. This is a proof, not a filter, and it is outside the model where injection cannot reach it.
Credential exfiltration through model outputA model that can see a secret can be persuaded to repeat itModels never see credentials. The secrets gateway injects them at the call boundary; the model receives an opaque reference.
Runaway loops and cost exhaustionAutonomous retry logic can spend a month's budget in an hourLoops are bounded at design time and rejected by the editor if unbounded. Soft budget limits degrade model tier or concurrency; hard limits fail closed before spending.
Silent quality regressionA prompt or model change degrades output with no error and no alertImmutable releases with locked dependencies and evaluation gates that block promotion, plus automatic reversion of autonomy when measured accuracy breaches its bound.

Two honest limits. First, a Customer VPC or Private deployment moves execution into your infrastructure, which means the controls on your side of that boundary become yours to operate — we document the split precisely rather than implying we still cover it. Second, model providers are subprocessors with their own security posture; ours is described here, theirs is named on the subprocessor page.

Get the evidence

Penetration-test summary letter, architecture overview, pre-answered CAIQ and SIG-lite, BCP and DR summary and the insurance certificate, all under a click-through NDA.

Open the document portal

Talk to the people who built it

A technical review with the engineers who wrote the effect compiler and the secrets gateway. Bring your architects and your questionnaire.

Book a technical review

wGrow Technologies Pte Ltd · Singapore · [email protected] · Controls described apply to KrewOS Cloud unless a tier is named. Self-hosted deployments shift some controls to the customer; the split is documented in the architecture overview.