Trust Centre · Security
Written to answer the questionnaire before you send it.
Every control below is described the way an assessor would want it described: what it is, how it is enforced, and what it does not cover. Where a control is only on certain tiers, the tier is named. Where something is planned rather than shipped, it says planned.
Pre-answered CAIQ and SIG-lite are available under the click-through NDA. Last reviewed 14 Aug 2026.
Architecture and tenant isolation
KrewOS separates a Control Plane — identity, catalogue, manifests, policies, evaluations, releases — from an Execution Plane that runs compiled plans and holds run state. Every request carries a tenant context that is resolved at the edge and enforced at the data layer, not in application code that a bug could bypass.
Tenant isolation
Row-level isolation on every table with tenant scoping enforced by the database, plus separate object-storage prefixes with per-tenant encryption context. Cross-tenant queries are structurally impossible, not merely disallowed.
Network segmentation
Private subnets for all data stores, no public database endpoints, egress restricted to an allow-listed model gateway and declared connectors. Administrative access only through an authenticated bastion with session recording.
Execution sandboxing
Generated and custom code runs in ephemeral, resource-capped sandboxes with no ambient credentials, a restricted filesystem and network access limited to declared endpoints. Sandboxes are destroyed after each run.
Secrets gateway
Credentials are injected at the point of call by a gateway process. Keys never appear in prompts, logs, manifests, exports, support tooling or crash dumps, and are never returned by any API.
Compile-time effect proof
Before a release exists, the compiler statically proves that no path runs from untrusted input to an external side effect without an intervening approval gate. If the property fails, there is no release to deploy.
Dedicated options
Cloud Dedicated gives you isolated execution resources; Customer VPC and Private deployment move the Execution Plane into infrastructure you control, with the Control Plane still governing centrally.
Control summary
The scannable version. Availability by tier is stated where it differs.
| Domain | Control | How it is enforced | Availability | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Encryption | In transit | TLS 1.3, HSTS, modern cipher suites only; internal service-to-service traffic mutually authenticated | All tiers | Shipped |
| Encryption | At rest | AES-256 on all volumes, object storage and backups, with per-tenant encryption context | All tiers | Shipped |
| Encryption | Customer-managed keys | Your KMS key, revocable; revocation renders tenant data unreadable within the rotation window | Regulated tier | Shipped |
| Identity | SSO — OIDC and SAML | Domain-based discovery at sign-in; just-in-time provisioning with group-to-role mapping | Professional and above | Shipped |
| Identity | MFA | TOTP and WebAuthn; enforceable tenant-wide, mandatory for administrator roles | All tiers | Shipped |
| Identity | SCIM provisioning | User and group lifecycle synchronised from your directory; deprovisioning revokes sessions immediately | Professional and above | Shipped |
| Access | RBAC and segregation of duties | Role sets aligned to the platform personas; approver cannot be preparer where dual approval is configured | All tiers | Shipped |
| Access | Privileged access | No standing production access. Time-boxed, four-eyes-approved, ticket-linked, fully session-recorded and surfaced in your tenant audit log | All tiers | Shipped |
| Access | Support impersonation | Requires explicit tenant consent per session, is read-only by default, is time-limited and appears in your audit trail while it is happening | All tiers | Shipped |
| SDLC | Code review and branch protection | Two-reviewer requirement on the compiler, the secrets gateway and the policy engine; signed commits; no direct pushes to release branches | n/a | Shipped |
| SDLC | Dependency and secret scanning | SCA and secret detection on every pull request and nightly on all release branches; critical findings block the build | n/a | Shipped |
| SDLC | SAST and container scanning | Static analysis on every build; base images rebuilt and rescanned weekly with a 7-day critical patch target | n/a | Shipped |
| Data | DLP and redaction | Configurable detection and redaction of identifiers before content reaches a model provider, with the redaction map retained inside your region | Professional and above | Shipped |
| Data | Prompt and output logging controls | Per-project setting for whether prompt and completion bodies are retained; metadata and evidence references are always retained | All tiers | Shipped |
| Resilience | Backup and restore | Continuous write-ahead archiving with point-in-time recovery; restores rehearsed quarterly and the result recorded | All tiers | Shipped |
| Resilience | Recovery targets | RPO ≤ 15 minutes, RTO ≤ 4 hours standard; tighter targets available by agreement on the Regulated tier | All tiers | Shipped |
| Monitoring | Security logging | Centralised, tamper-evident logs with 400-day retention; authentication, authorisation, privileged access and effect execution are all logged | All tiers | Shipped |
| Monitoring | Anomaly detection on agent behaviour | Alerting on abnormal effect frequency, budget burn and retrieval patterns per crew | Professional and above | Planned Q4 2026 |
| Assurance | Bug bounty | Private programme with invited researchers; public programme deferred until the disclosure process has run a full year | n/a | Private only |
Incident response
- Detect and declare
Automated alerting plus a 24×7 on-call rota. Any suspected incident is declared within 30 minutes of triage rather than after confirmation.
- Contain
Credential rotation, session revocation and tenant-level isolation are pre-scripted and rehearsed, not improvised during the event.
- Notify
Affected tenants notified within 24 hours of confirmation, with what is known, what is not yet known and what you should do. PDPC notification handled in line with the PDPA where thresholds are met.
- Post-mortem
Written, blameless, shared with affected tenants within 10 business days and summarised publicly on the status page.
People and process
- Background screening
All staff, pre-employment - Security training
Onboarding plus annual - Secure-coding training
Engineers, annual - Phishing simulation
Quarterly - Access review
Quarterly, evidenced - Device management
MDM, disk encryption, EDR - Offboarding
Access revoked same day - Vendor review
Annual, risk-tiered - Policy set
17 documents, annually reviewed
The full policy index, including which policies are available for review under NDA, ships in the security pack.
Threats specific to agent platforms
Generic SaaS controls do not cover the interesting risks here. These four are where an agent platform actually gets hurt, and each has a structural answer rather than a policy answer.
| Risk | Why it is different | Structural control |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection reaching an external action | Instructions hidden in a retrieved document can attempt to steer an agent into sending, posting or paying | The compiler proves at build time that no untrusted-input path reaches a declared external effect without an approval gate. This is a proof, not a filter, and it is outside the model where injection cannot reach it. |
| Credential exfiltration through model output | A model that can see a secret can be persuaded to repeat it | Models never see credentials. The secrets gateway injects them at the call boundary; the model receives an opaque reference. |
| Runaway loops and cost exhaustion | Autonomous retry logic can spend a month's budget in an hour | Loops are bounded at design time and rejected by the editor if unbounded. Soft budget limits degrade model tier or concurrency; hard limits fail closed before spending. |
| Silent quality regression | A prompt or model change degrades output with no error and no alert | Immutable releases with locked dependencies and evaluation gates that block promotion, plus automatic reversion of autonomy when measured accuracy breaches its bound. |
Two honest limits. First, a Customer VPC or Private deployment moves execution into your infrastructure, which means the controls on your side of that boundary become yours to operate — we document the split precisely rather than implying we still cover it. Second, model providers are subprocessors with their own security posture; ours is described here, theirs is named on the subprocessor page.
Get the evidence
Penetration-test summary letter, architecture overview, pre-answered CAIQ and SIG-lite, BCP and DR summary and the insurance certificate, all under a click-through NDA.
Open the document portalTalk to the people who built it
A technical review with the engineers who wrote the effect compiler and the secrets gateway. Bring your architects and your questionnaire.
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